Introduction
During the great depression protectionism spread rapidly. By 1933 world trade was only a third of what it was in 1929. Part of this slump had to do with the decline in economic activity, but several studies estimate the contribution of protectionist forces somewhere between 25 to 50 percent of the total decline in world trade. 1 The protectionist response started in the United States with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act passed in June 1930, which raised tariffs by 23 percent according to Irwin (1998) . Many countries retaliate.
According to Masden (2001) , the world average effective tariff (the ratio of the value of import duties and import value) increased from 9 percent in 1929 to 20 percent by 1933, with values as high as 30 percent in Germany and the UK.
Several authors have warned of a similar -albeit more timid-trend developing as the current crisis deepens (Baldwin and Evenett, 2008 or 2009 and Gamberoni and Newfarmer 2009 . Moreover, as suggested by Baldwin and Evenett, 2009, announcing that "the time has come to put an end to an increase in tariffs and to move in the opposite direction''.
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The objective of this paper is threefold. First, we want to assess the extent to which countries can respond to the crisis by increasing their tariffs without violating their WTO obligations. Second, to study the tariff response of countries which have been 1 Irwin (1998) suggests that a quarter of the decline in US trade may be due to tariff increases associated with the Smooth-Hawley Act (part of effective increase was due to declining prices associated with the depression in the presence of specific tariffs), whereas Masden (2001) attributes half of the decline to increases in tariff and non-tariff barriers. 2 Bacchetta and Piermartini (2009) focus on the value of WTO's tariff bindings.
3 subject to economic crisis in the recent past, and finally to provide estimates of the tariff hikes we can expect in the current crisis.
Tariff water, smoke and deeper waters
The GATT and the Agricultural Agreement of the Uruguay Round impose a legal limit to the extent of tariff hikes by WTO members. This legal limit is called a bound tariff and is what is actually negotiated in the WTO. 4 The difference between the bound and the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) applied tariff, measures in principle the degree of flexibility available to each country within its WTO obligations. It is called tariff overhang or more commonly tariff water.
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Tariff water is generally low in OECD's manufacturing sector but can reach very high levels in some emerging economies, or in agriculture. In order to assess the importance that the protectionist legal response can take in different countries, we estimated the average tariff water in each country or region. To do so we follow Kee et al. (2009) (1) where B ic is the bound tariff on good i in country c, T is the MFN applied tariff on good i in country c, imports is the value of imports on good i in country c and elasticity is the absolute value of the import demand elasticity on good i in country c. It is straightforward to see that Water is given by the difference between the weighted average bound tariff and the MFN applied tariff, where weights are given by the product of import demand elasticities and the value of imports. Our estimates 6 suggest that world's tariff water is 11 percent, but is close to zero in the US and China, and higher than 70 percent in many least developed countries and 6 Estimates are computed using observations for the latest available year, which is at best 2008.
5 small island states (see Table 1 ). There is also quite significant variance across sectors with world's agriculture tariff water at around 27 percent, whereas manufacturing tariff water is around 9 percent (see Appendix Table) . Higher income levels are usually associated with lower MFN tariffs, but also lower levels of tariff water. The average tariff water is 7 percent among high income countries, and it doubles for middle income countries, and doubles once again for low income countries to reach 36 percent.
Given that on average world MFN tariffs are at around 5 percent, tariff water could potentially allow tariffs to triple without violating GATT's bound obligations. So potentially, we could have a protectionist reaction on tariff lines with positive water that is much stronger than the one observed during the great depression in the absence of GATT or WTO commitments. Thus, WTO tariff binding commitments would be of little value. However, a significant share of the policy space allowed by these high tariff bindings is potentially irrelevant as we discuss below.
Smoke in the water at the other end of Lake Geneva
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There are at least two reasons why these numbers may provide an overestimate of the extent of flexibility available. First, some of the bound tariffs may be above the prohibitive tariffs, and therefore although it is legally possible to increase tariffs above their prohibitive levels it would be economically meaningless to do so. A problem with equation (2) is the determination of prohibitive tariffs. To calculate them we use a linear approximation around the equilibrium imports in each country. Start with the definition of the import demand elasticity, and note that a prohibitive tariff implies Δm i =-m i . Then solve for the prohibitive tariff recalling that the domestic price is given by
Thus the prohibitive tariff can be readily calculated using estimates of import demand elasticity at the six digit level of the Harmonized System for more than 100 countries in Kee et al (2008) . They are then replaced in (2) to obtain a measure of useless water.
As mentioned earlier, preferential trade also makes bound tariffs, and water less relevant. To see this simply note that as MFN tariff increases, preferential trade is unaffected. If anything it increases. At the limit, if all trade is preferential, then an increase in the MFN applied tariff to the bound or prohibitive level is meaningless.
We suggest two corrections for this. First, the distribution of preferential imports across goods and its correlation with bound, applied and prohibitive tariffs matters. Thus the weights used in the weighted average need to take this into account. The idea is that if imports of good i are exclusively preferential, then the difference between bounds or 7 prohibitive tariffs on the one hand, and MFN tariffs on the other hand, is irrelevant when it comes to measure the extent of flexibility available in the system. It is all deeper water that is beyond the legal scope of the WTO. Deeper water is then formally defined as: Uganda, but it is more than 50 percent of tariff water in Australia, Chile, the European Union, Cambodia, Mexico, Namibia, Norway, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
In any case, the economic irrelevance of tariff water due to the presence of smoke does not constraint in an economic significant way the protectionist response allowed by GATT's bindings. On average the remaining policy space still represents 62 percent of tariff water. And given that tariff water is about twice the existing levels of MFN protection, there is enough policy space left to more than double MFN protection.
Assessing the protectionist response in previous crisis
One important step on our way to assessing the protectionist response during the current crisis, is to look back and measure the protectionist response in previous crises (see also Eichengreen and Irwin, 2009 We also try different specifications where we control for the size of the country (GDP), as well as the share of neighbors that are in an economic crisis according to our definition. Our preferred specification also includes an interaction between crisis on the one hand and economic size and the share of neighbors in an economic crisis to try to capture any potential heterogeneity. It is given by:
where Neigb is the share in GDP of the 10 closest neighbors of country c that had a crisis in year t. Other sources of heterogeneity are also possible. For example Eichengreen and Irwin (2009) suggest that countries with a fixed exchange rate regime (and perfect capital mobility) are more likely to resort to a protectionist response during an economic crisis. The severity of the crisis may also matter. And therefore we could check for different types of economic crisis (e.g. declines in real GDP of more than 2 percentage points). Standard errors are in parenthesis and are corrected for clustering across products and countries. a for p < 0.01, b for p < 0.05 and c stands for p < 0.10. All regressions include countryxproduct fixed effects, as well as year dummies.
Results are reported in Table 3 . The first column suggests that an economic crisis increases MFN tariffs on average by 2.0 percent. After controlling for the size of the country (large countries tend to have smaller tariffs), and the share of neighbors that are also in an economic crisis in the second column, the coefficient on crisis increases to 2.2 percent. In the third column we introduce the interaction term between crisis and size, and obtain a positive coefficient on the interaction term, signaling that large countries are more likely to increase their tariffs than small countries. 10 Note that the coefficient on crisis becomes negative, but the full derivative with respect to crisis that takes into account the interaction term is never negative and oscillates between 0 and 7 percent in the sample. It is equal to 3.2 percent at the mean of the sample.
Finally, in the fourth column we report the results of our preferred specification corresponding to equation (7) above. The coefficient on crisis is negative, but again after taking into account the interaction term with log of GDP, we have that the derivative of MFN tariffs with respect to crisis is always positive. At the mean of the sample the increase in MFN tariffs is 3.1 percent, and for the country with the largest GDP the increase is equal to 6.1 percent, and 0.6 percent for the smallest country. An additional interesting result is that if all 10 neighboring countries also get into an economic crisis (Share_Neighb=1), then the MFN tariff increases on average by 5.8 percent. The interaction between the share of neighbors in a crisis and the country itself having a crisis is quantitatively very small and is not statistically different from zero.
We also perform some robustness checks. Our results so far suggest that since 1995 up to 2008 increases in MFN tariffs during economic crisis have been modest, especially in small countries. The fifth column checks whether they have also been long lived, by introducing a lagged crisis variable. We obtain again that countries increase their tariff on average by 2 percent during the economic crisis, but that one year later this is reversed. This regression (column 5) also implicitly addresses the potential problem of endogeneity or reverse causality. Indeed, tariffs are not always higher in countries that are more subject to crisis, but they seem to rise in the year of the crisis, and decline one year later.
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In column (6) we use an alternative definition of crisis to check for the robustness of the results. One may argue that in deep crisis protectionism responses will be stronger.
Thus, in column (6) crisis is defined as a fall in real GDP of more than 3 percent. The results suggest again an increase in protectionism. Perhaps surprisingly the protectionism increase during strong recessions is smaller than in the presence of shallow recessions (although they are not statistically different from each other). Maybe countries in deep recessions are more likely to take the opportunity to engage in deeper institutional and policy reforms that will prevent large increases in protectionism.
Columns (7) reports results using group averages, and weighted least squares, where weights are given by group size. Indeed, given that crisis does not vary across products, the error can be correlated across HS6 digit lines within a country every year.
Our previous standard error estimates are all corrected non-parametrically for the correlation in the error term within groups, and we have a sufficiently large number of clusters to ensure the asymptotic properties of this correction. Nevertheless we provide weighted least squares estimates using group averages as a robustness check. Column (7) provides results for the specification in column (1). The estimated increase in tariff is not statistically different from the one estimated in column (1), but it is not statistically different from zero either, suggesting that the increase can potentially be much lower than suggested in our previous estimates where we may have underestimated the variance of these estimates.
We explore two additional sources of response heterogeneity. 11 First in a world where a growing share of trade is undertaken in intermediate goods, one may expect the protectionist response to be smaller in intermediate goods. This is checked in column (9) where we introduced the interaction between crisis and a dummy that takes the value 1 when the good is not a final consumption good (this dummy does not enter the regression by itself because it is perfectly collinear with our country*product fixed effects). The interaction term is negative and statistically significant as expected. Second, one may expect that the protectionist response depends on how much policy space is available, so we also introduce an interaction term between crisis and tariff water after correcting for smoke in column 9. The coefficient is small, negative and statistically insignificant, so policy space does not seem to be the constraint on countries protectionist response. (Policy space does not enter the regression by itself because we only have it available for 2008 tariffs, and therefore it is perfectly correlated with the country*product fixed effects.) The last column introduces all these interaction terms together.
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Estimating the 2009 protectionist response: fire in the sky?
We use the estimates reported in the fourth column of Table 3 
Concluding Remarks
The amount of policy space left by WTO legal tariff bindings allows for an increase in MFN tariffs similar to what we observed during the great depression and this after controlling for the smoke in the tariff water, i.e., bindings above prohibitive levels and widespread regional trade agreements.
However, when looking at recent economic crisis, it seems that this large policy space has been rarely used by countries facing economic crisis. Large countries tend to increase their tariffs more than small countries when facing a crisis, and even more when Obviously, MFN tariffs are only one of many instruments in the protectionist toolbox. Baldwin and Evenett (2009) warned us of the increase in the use of murkier forms of protectionism like during the great depression, and a similar study on the evolution of other forms of protectionism is needed. This will help us understand why countries are not using the policy space available during economic crisis. If it is the simple recognition that protectionism may not be the right response and that it can exacerbate the problem it is trying to correct, then we shouldn't be observing increases in murkier forms of protectionism. However, if the reason has to do with country reputation and fear of signaling beggar-thy-neighbor behavior to other countries, then increases in murkier and less transparent forms of protectionism are consistent with smallest increases in MFN tariffs. Hopefully the first explanation is the correct one. But if murkier and less transparent forms of protectionism are spreading, then an adequate response by the international community would be to bring more transparency to the system. 
Appendix
